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ADDENDUM A

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE
__ .

_____

___

__

*

STATE OF UTAH,

*
*

Plaintiff,

*
*

V.

*

SYDNEY ARTHUR WENGREER

*

Defendant.

*
*

MEMORANDUMIDECISION

Case No: 021100187 FS

*

This case is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Arrest of Judgment jor for New
Trail Based Upon Prosecutorial Misconduct. The Plaintiff responded to the motion aind submitted
affidavits from two jurors, Ann Church Tueller and Kelli Anne Simard.
A hearing was held on October 25, 2002. At the conclusion of the heariilg berth sides
desired to supplement their memorandum and the Court allowed them to do so. IWhajt then
followed was a series of reply memoranda and supplemental memoranda. Finailvl on November
21, 2002, the Plaintiff filed a Notice to SubmitforDecision.
Defendant's motion centers on the jury* s access to an audiotape of a telephone call that
the victim made to the Defendant under the direction of the police. A portion of jthe audio tape
was admitted into evidence at trial as Exhibit 20. Thefirstportion of the audioit&pe, Much was a
short conversation between the victim and Defendant's wife, was not admitted.into evidence. The
State failed to redact the inadmissible portion and the complete tape went to the Jury*
Defendant argues that the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by not
redacting the inadmissible portion of the tape and knowingly allowed it to go to the jury. Plaintiff
argues that the submission of the unredacted tape is not prejudicial error and is;hannliss$ enror.
Additionally, Plaintiff argues the jurors did not listen to the inadmissible portion of thp tape.

The following fects are not disputedby the parties:
1.

The Court clearly ruled at least two tunes that the conversation
between the victim and Defendant's wife was inadmissible.

2.

The Court instructed State's counsel to redact the inadmissible
portion.

3.

The prosecutor understood clearly it was not to go to the jury.

4.

The complete tape containing the inadmissible portion went toit&e
jury.

5.

The jurors did not listen to the inadmissible portion of the tape-

The prosecutor tries to explain away or justify what happened with the tjape rather than
simply take responsibility. The State justifies the submission of the unredacted tape by saying it
was the hurried nature of the trial, the trial taaics of defense counsel, the experience) of defense
counsel, the inexperience of the prosecutor and the demeanor of the Court. The
remains, rather than blame someone else, the prosecutor was clearly told two tiroes tjhe portion
was inadmissible and needed to be removed.
There is no excuse for what happened The redaction of the tape shoulil havd easily been
done. Prosecutor had numerous staif and an officer at the trial. It is disappointing it |/as not done
because it jeopardizes the integrity of the system.
Defendant argues that analysis should be made under a stricter standard of "flagrant
prosecutorial misconduct in defiance of a trial court ruling." State v Ubaldl 462

1001, 1009

(Conn. 1983). Plaintiff argues the analysis should be made under a harmless error analysis
Under both standards, the Court must look to what actually happened anjd what affect it
had upon the jury. The essential fact is that the unredacted tape went to the jury and xhey followed
the Court's instruction to not listen to the inadmissible portion. The affidavits of[Mrs! Tueller and
Ms, Simard state they only listened to the conversation between the victim and Defendant, and the
affidavits further state:
However, we were aware that we, as jurors* were not to consider
any evidence that was offered but not admitted. Understanding th&t
the recorded conversation between Kalie Smethurst and Sydney
Wengreen's wife was offered - - but not admitted - - we did not
listen to or consider that portion of the cassette.

3>?

Defendant argues because of the intentional misconduct of the prosecutor, the State
should be punished This argument ignores the juiy's verdict and what they based their verdict on
As stated above, the jury followed the Court's ruling on the inadmissibility of that portion of the
tape They did not listen to it They were not influenced by it in any way and their verdict should
not be1 disregarded because of the prosecutor's conduct
Defendant has failed to present any evidence or fact that the jury listened to the
inadmissible portion or that they were influenced by the inadmissible portion being in the jury
room. The Courtfindsthat the actions of the prosecutor do not rise to the samd level as those in
the Ubaldi case
Therefore, the Court denies Defendant's motion Defendant is ordered to immediately
contact Adult Probation and Parole to complete a pre-sentence investigation replort {Sentencing is
set for Friday, February 28,2003 at 9 00 a m
Dated this J 7 _ d a y of January, 2003
BY THE COURT

Thomas L Willmore
District Court Judge
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ADDENDUM B

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case Number: 021100187

VS
SYDNEY ARTHUR WENGREEN,
Defendant.

This case is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for a New Trial. Procedurally, this
case was tried to a jury on October 2-4, 2002. The jury found Defendant guilty of one count of
aggravated sex abuse of a child, a first degree felony pursuant to U.CA §76-5-404.1(3).
Wengreen was found not guilty of two other counts of aggravated sex abuse of a child.
On March 27, 2003, Wengreen was sentenced to a mandatory indeterminate term of
five years to life in the Utah State Prison. Wengreen filed a Motion for a New Trial on April 7,
2003 with a supporting Memorandum on June 23, 2003. The State responded to the Motion
on July 23, 2003, to which Wengreen replied on September 23, 2003.
A hearing on the Motion for a New Trial was held on October 1, 2003. The Court took
the motion under consideration. Shortly after the hearing on October 13, 2003, counsel for the
parties informed the Court that an interview of Wengreen would be conducted with law
enforcement personnel and that the Court would not need to rule on the Motion for a New
Trial. At that time the Court informed counsel that a Notice toJSubmii for Decision must be
filed before the Court would issue a decision.
Page 1 of
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On December 12, 2003, the State filed a letter (not a Notice to Submit) indicating there
had been no resolution of the case. Because no Notice to Submit was filed the matter was not
presented to the Court to review and make a decision. Subsequently, on April 26, 2004,
Wengreen's counsel sent a letter to the Court asking for the Court to decide the Motion. Once
again, no Notice to Submit was filed.
The Court will treat the letter as a Notice to Submit. Because of the length of time from
the October 1, 2003 hearing, the Court has taken considerable time to repeatedly review the
video tape of oral arguments, memoranda and the case file prior to issuing this Memorandum
Decision.
Wengreen's Motion is made pursuant to Rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure which provides that in order for him to be granted a new trial he must show an
"...error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party."
Wengreen argues that after the trial "new evidence arose which questions the integrity
of the jury verdict." He asserts three areas of new evidence:
(1) The victim changed or recanted the events she testified to at the trial.
(2) New evidence shows at the time of trial the victim had a history of and was suffering
from emotional disorders affecting her ability to provide reliable testimony at trial.
(3) The State failed to provide material exculpatory evidence which is that the victim
was previously sexually abused by other individuals.
The Court will consider these arguments in the order they are asserted.
1. The victim changed or recanted her testimony after the trial.

Page 2 of
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In considering this argument the Court points out that there has been much confusion in
this case, with most of it being created by letters and statements of others and not the victim.
Specifically, the victim's family members and therapists state things that never occurred, e.g.,
that the victim fainted on the witness stand. This never happened and it is beyond the Court
as to why the victim's family and others make such statements. These types of statements
only confuse the facts of the case and harm the victim.
Regarding this argument raised by Defendant, the Court finds that defendant has failed
to present any evidence to the Court that the victim recanted her testimony.
Therefore, the issue becomes, has the victim (also referred to as K.S.) changed her
testimony? The defendant argues that she has changed her testimony in statements to third
parties after the trial and that this constitutes newly discovered evidence. The State argues
that more details have come out as the victim received counseling, but that does not mean
she did not testify truthfully and does not constitute newly discovered evidence.
The Court has carefully reviewed each fact that allegedly differs from the victim's trial
testimony and the post trial statements. The Court finds that the victim's testimony at the
preliminary hearing and trial remained consistent even as she was vigorously questioned by
defense counsel. Further, the Court finds that it is reportedly thmughjhjrd j^artjgs that the
victim's version of events changed. The Court must assess these new facts and determine if
they are reliable. The Court finds that the victim was hospitalized shortly after the trial for
mental problems. However, the statements the victim made to third parties are clearly
hearsay and the Court is concerned about the reliability of the statements.

Page 3 of
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But even if the Court considers the statements to be reliable the Court is concerned
about whether they amount to sufficient newly discovered evidence to justify a new trial.
ALnotime throughout thejDre]iminary hearing or trial did thACourt observe any material
discrepancies or misleading statements by the.victim^ In other words, her testimony always
remained consistent.

^

<**i * ** * ' - $ ' * * * * < ^ * 6 * P « ^ ^

Further, the Court finds that the combination of the trial and the in court outburst of
defendant's wife directed against the victim was very traumatic to the victim. The outburst by
defendant's wife appears to be the last straw" that sent the victim into a downward emotional
\

illness spiral.
The unstricken portions of Scott E. BlickenstaiTs Affidavit of July 3, 2003 shed
substantial light on this issue. Specifically, Mr. Blickenstaff states:
(1) "Kalie Smethurst is much worse following her testifying in Court than she was
prior to that traumatic experience." Paragraph 10 of Scott E. Blickenstaff s Affidavit July
3, 2003.
(2) "There is a phenomena well known to both therapists and police, that when
individuals are providing information about which they feel anxious, they will provide the
safest information first. As therapy (or interrogations) continue, individuals will continue
to reveal information which they were too anxious to reveal initially." Paragraph 3 of
Scott E. Blickenstaff s Affidavit.
(3) "...During this time I found no evidence that she was unable to tell the truth or that
she would have distorted her testimony as a result of mental illness." Paragraph 1 of
Page 4 of
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Scott E. Blickenstaff s Affidavit.
Therefore, the Court finds that the victim's statements after the trial are not credible and
reliable given that they are provided through third pattyJasiiniQay and constitute hearsay. I
also find that the statements do not arise to the level of newly discovered evidence. Most
importantly, I find that the victim's trial testimony was consistent with her preliminary hearing
testimony and the alleged changed testimony only arose when her mental state worsened to
the point she was hospitalized.
Therefore, on this point raised by defendant the Motion for New Trial is denied.
2. The victim was suffering from a mental illness which affected her ability to provide reliable
testimony.
The second point raised by defendant is that there is newly discovered evidence that
the victim had a mental illness which prohibited her from providing reliable testimony at trial. It
is important to note that defendant's argument centers on what happened to the victim's
mental condition after the trial and alleged statements she made after the trial.
It is undisputed that K.S.' mental condition deteriorated after the trial. She was taken to
the behavioral section of the Logan Regional Hospital and later admitted to the Utah State
Mental Hospital.^1** v^o-s ato* be^~M~ec^c<4 ^cvar -to -W\&\
Defendant asserts that K.S. was diagnosed with various mental illnesses and disorders
such as: chronic and severe post-traumatic stress disorder, underlying dysthymic disorder,
eating disorder, impulse control disorder, depression, anxiety and dissociative symptoms.
Defendant has filed with the Court the Affidavit of Dr. Vickie R. Gregory. Dr. Gregory reviewed
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written information, videotapes, and transcripts concerning K.S.' condition and treatment. Dr.
Gregory was not able to review the psychiatric and psychological records of K.S.' treating
professionals. Dr. Gregory's conclusion questions K.S/ competency and her ability to provide
accurate and reliable testimony because of her psychological disorders.
A careful review of Dr. Gregory's affidavit generally states what possibly or "could have
effected her ability to provide accurate, reliable and trustworthy testimony." Gregory Affidavit fl
12. Defendant fails to show the Court any specific incidents or testimony that affects the
reliability of K.S/ trial testimony.
However, the Affidavit of Scott E. Blickenstaff states: "During this time I found no
evidence that she was unable to tell the truth or that she would have distorted her testimony
as a result of mental illness." Blickenstaff Affidavit U 1. Also, Mr. Blickenstaff states, "I know
of no information that indicates that K.S.' testimony was not accurate." Blickenstaff Affidavit fl
9.
In considering this point of Defendant's motion, it is extremely difficult for the Court to
separate what was the victim's psychological condition at trial and did it affect her reliability
and what was her psychological condition after trial. Therefore, the focus must be on the
reliability of her trial testimony.
Considering this issue, the Court finds that K.S.' significant mental illnesses arose after
the trial. The Court finds the victim's mental condition was fragile at the time of trial. The
Court further finds that the aggravation of K.S.' condition occurred because of the trial and
outburst of defendant's wife at the conclusion of the trial and not before or during her
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testimony. The Court further finds that Defendant has not met his burden to show the newly
discovered evidence affected the reliability of K.S.' trial testimony. Specifically, the Court finds
that K.S/ trial testimony was consistent with her preliminary hearing testimony.
Therefore, defendants motion on this point is denied.
3. The State failed to provide material exculpatory evidence to defendant.
Defendant next asserts that the State failed to provide material exculpatory evidence of
which it was aware. Specifically, that at least three other individuals had sexually abused K.S.
From the memoranda and at oral argument it appears that K.S. was molested by a
family member prior to the acts of Defendant. Also, after Defendant's alleged acts, K.S. was
sexually touched by two juveniles in April 2002.
The State argues it did not receive a police report for the April 2002 incident until after
Defendant's trial. The State alleges it provided to Defendant a copy of the report in November
2002. The Court finds there is nothing that shows the State knew of any of the alleged sexual
assaults on K.S. prior to the trial. The Court finds once the knowledge of the alleged sexual
assaults was discovered then the State gave notice to Defendant of the incidents.
Finally, the Court finds if the alleged incidents were known by Defendant prior to the
trial the incidents would most likely not be admissible and would not be such as to render a
different result probable on retrial. This last point will be more fully discussed in point 4.
4. Even if the evidence amounts to newly discovered evidence would a different result be
probable on the retrial of the case.
In weighing the alleged newly discovered evidence, the Court must factor in a
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determination as to whether the newly discovered evidence would likely change the result.
State v Duncan. 132 P2d 121,124 (Utah 1942). Stated another way, the Court must
determine if the evidence "...be such as to render a different result probable on retrial of the
case." State v. Harris. 513 P2d 438, 440 (Utah 1973).
In weighing the newly discovered evidence submitted by Defendant, the Court notes
that this trial was not simply the testimony of K.S. against the Defendant. A pretext call was
conducted by police on March 1, 2002 between K.S. and the Defendant. The telephone call
was presented to the jury. The Court places great weight on the fact that the call occurred 7
months before the trial. It also occurred months before the alleged abuse of K.S. by others.
The Court finds that K.S/ statements in the call are consistent with her preliminary hearing
and trial testimony.
Prior to issuing this Memorandum Decision the Court reviewed the audio tape. The
Court places great weight on the fact that K.S. was able to explain at trial what was said in the
call and what Defendant did as she was questioned by the State and defense counsel. The
Court also places great weight on the fact that Defendant carefully explained his side of the
telephone conversation at trial.
The Court finds that after the jury had heard the taped conversation and the
explanations by K.S. and Defendant, the jury believed K.S/ explanation. The Court finds this
because the tape relates to the only charge Defendant was convicted of. Defendant was
acquitted of the olher charges which had no supporting evidence such as the pretext call.
Therefore, the Court first finds that all of the alleged new evidence does not rise to the
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level of newly discovered evidence sufficient to grant a new trial. Second, the Court finds that
even if the evidence is sufficient newly discovered evidence, it would not probably change the
outcome of the jury verdict.
Therefore Defendant's motion for a new trial is denied. The State is directed to prepare
an order conforming to this Memorandum Decision.

St vs Wengreen/TLW/adb
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

vs.
Case No. 021100187
SYDNEY ARTHUR WENGREEN,
Judge Tomas Willmore
Defendant.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion for a New Trial
Having reviewed said motion with its accompanying memorandum, the State's
memorandum in opposition, and having conducted a hearing on the matter, the Court
finds the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
The Defendant argues that he is entitled to a new trial, asserting that after the
defendant's jury trial "new evidence arose which questions the integrity of the jury
verdict. First, the defendant argues that the victim changed or recanted the events she
testified to at the defendant's trial; second, the defendant asserts that new evidence shows
at the time of the trial, the victim had a history of, and was suffering from, emotional
disorders affecting her ability to provide reliable testimony at trial; third, the defendant
argues that the State of Utah failed to provide material exculpatory evidence, to wit: that
the victim was previosly sexually abused by other individuals.
First, the Court finds that the defendant has failed to present any evidence to the
Court that the victim recanted her testimony. The defendant argues that subsequent to the
trial, the victim changed her testimony in statements made to third parties. The Court
disagrees. The Court has carefully reviewed each fact that allegedly differs from the
victim's trial testimony and the post trial statements. The Court finds that the victim's
testimony at the preliminary hearing and the trial remained consistent even as she was
vigorously questioned by defense counsel. Further, the Court finds that it is reportedly
through third parties that the victim's version of events changed. The Court must assess
these new facts and determine if they are reliable. The Court finds that the victim was
hospitalized shortly after the trial for mental problems. However, the statements the

2

victim made to third parties are clearly hearsay and the Court is concerned about the
reliability of the statements. Nonetheless, the Court finds that even if it considered the
statements to be reliable, they are not sufficiently newly discovered evidence to justify a
new trial. Further, the Court finds that the combination of the trial and the in court
outburst of defendant's wife directed against the victim was very traumatic to the victim.
The outburst by defendant's wife appears to be the "last straw" that sent the victim into a
downward emotional illness spiral. This finding is supported by the unstricken portions
of Scott E. Blickenstaff s Affidavit of July 3, 2003, as outlined in the Court's
Memorandum Decision.
Next, the Court finds that the victim was not suffering from mental illness during
the defendant's trial to the extent that she could not offer reliable and honest testimony.
On this point, the Court finds that the victim's significant mental illnesses arose after the
trial. The Court finds that the victim's trial testimony was consistent with her preliminary
hearing testimony, and that the defendant has not met his burden to show that there is
newly discovered evidence that affected the reliability of the victim's trial testimony.
Next, the Court finds that the State of Utah disclosed to the defense evidence that
the victim had been previously sexually abused as soon as it became aware of this
evidence, and that had the defense known of these events they would not have been
admissible at trial, and even if they were they would not be of such a nature as to render a
different result probable on retrial. In considering the defendant's motion the Court finds

3

that the evidence against the defendant was not just his word against the victim's; rather,
the evidence at the trial - including a pretext call which the defendant did not adequately
explain at trial was such that a different outcome is unlikely if a new trial were granted.

CONCLUSION OF LAW AND ORDER
In weighing the alleged newly discovered evidence, the Court must determine
whether this evidence would likely change the result. State v. Duncan, 132 P.2d 121, 124
(Utah, 1942). Stated differently, the Court must determine if the evidence " . . . be such
as to render a different result probable on retrial of the case." State v. Harris, 513 P.2d
438, 440 (Utah 1973). Applying the Court's Findings of Fact as outlined above to the law
enunciated here, the Court finds that the defendant's Motion for a New Trial is without
i

merit.
THEREFORE:, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as
follows:
That the Defendant's Motion for a New Trial is denied.
DATED this

%

day of November, 2004.

BY THE COURT

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order to:

KENNETH R. BROWN
ATTORNEY FOR DEF.
10 W. BROADWAY, STE. 210
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101
SHANNON R. DEMLER
ATTORNEY FOR DEF.
76 WEST 100 NORTH
LOGAN, UTAH 84321
DATED THIS 6

day of November, 2004
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